Poking the Bear

When will Russia start to hit back at the West?

The Kremlin Under Siege: Factions, Frustrations, and the Slow Boil of NATO Pressure

In the tradition of The Big Reset, where the architects of the post-1945 financial order, anchored in dollar dominance and Western institutional control, face an inexorable unraveling through debt spirals, commodity rebellions, and the quiet accumulation of gold by BRICS challengers, the ongoing confrontation in Ukraine emerges as far more than a territorial clash. It is a high-stakes chapter in the broader geopolitical reset: a deliberate Western strategy of calibrated erosion, akin to the monetary manipulations that have propped up fiat systems for decades.

In a “boiled frog” scenario, NATO is using Ukraine to incrementally increase pain and suffering for the Putin regime. Long-range strikes in St Petersburg and even in Moscow are making this situation increasingly dangerous.

The western goal? To exhaust Russia economically and psychologically without triggering the nuclear “fire” that could accelerate the very multipolar order Moscow and its partners seek. Yet, as I have long warned, such engineered delays in power transitions breed dangerous miscalculations. Russia’s elite, led by Vladimir Putin, perceives this not as prudent containment but as existential provocation, pushing a nuclear-armed bear into a corner where restraint may soon give way to rupture.

This analysis dissects the Kremlin’s internal mood, factional divides, and narrative of “cooking on a slow fire,” before outlining three plausible scenarios if Western probing persists. Drawing extensively on voices from Russia’s strategic community, Sergei Karaganov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Trenin, and others, it reveals a regime resilient yet strained, where hardliners gain ground amid blurred red lines.

Factions and Mood in the Kremlin: Siloviki Ascendancy Amid Elite Erosion

Russia’s power architecture remains a personalized system orbiting President Putin, who acts as the supreme arbiter among competing blocs. The main division separates siloviki, hardline security officials from the FSB, the military, and the intelligence apparatus, from pragmatists in economic ministries, the Central Bank, and presidential administration technocrats.

The former, empowered by the “special military operation,” demand uncompromising confrontation: lowered nuclear thresholds, strikes on NATO enablers, and total mobilization. The latter, including Economic Development Minister Maksim Reshetnikov, Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina, and adviser Maksim Oreshkin, emphasize macroeconomic vulnerabilities—persistent inflation, rouble volatility, and the drag of war spending (now exceeding 6% of GDP). A widening rift has emerged, with the FSB enjoying near-total freedom to purge elites via arrests, forced nationalizations (surpassing 4 trillion roubles), and opaque deaths, dismantling the informal pacts that once governed corruption and rents.

This Darwinian struggle has intensified amid tangible strains: Q1 2026 GDP contraction of 0.3%, a 5.9 trillion rouble budget deficit in the first four months, and Ukrainian drone/missile strikes on refineries and infrastructure. Business elites, oligarchs like Suleiman Kerimov and Oleg Deripaska, face coerced “voluntary contributions” and steeper taxes, breeding quiet resentment. Public mood shows Putin’s approval dipping, with 60% favoring negotiations. Yet the “rally-round-the-flag” dynamic persists, fueled by framing the conflict as existential against “the collective West.”

Ultranationalist voices amplify hardline pressure. At the June 2026 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Tsargrad Institute figures Konstantin Malofeev and Alexander Dugin outlined optimistic projections: Russian forces occupying Kyiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv by 2036, EU fragmentation, and Russia as a global security guarantor. These “Z-bloggers” and ideologues critique perceived military shortcomings while demanding victory without compromise.

The overall atmosphere is one of “systemic erosion” rather than imminent implosion. Elite cohesion holds through repression and shared threat perception, but fractures surface dramatically, as in May 2026, when loyalist lawyer Ilya Remeslo publicly branded Putin a “war criminal and a thief” before psychiatric confinement. Such episodes, combined with over 352,000 reported Russian fatalities, signal growing irritation even among insiders. Factional infighting is likely to intensify gradually, with siloviki leveraging external pressure to consolidate influence.

Putin and Associates on NATO’s Incrementalism: “Cooking Russia on a Slow Fire”

Kremlin discourse characterizes NATO’s measured support, progressing from Javelins to ATACMS, F-16s, and deep-strike permissions, as classic “salami-slicing” or, in inverted Russian parlance, “cooking on a slow fire.” Incrementalism avoids decisive red-line crossings while steadily degrading Russia’s position, mirroring the “slow boil” analoque. Ivan Timofeev, RIAC Director General, captured this in a formulation echoed across elite circles: “Roughly speaking, they [the West] are trying to cook Russia on a slow fire. Nuclear escalation is a way to jump out of the boiler, abruptly bringing the temperature to the boiling point. The problem is that after jumping out of the boiler, you can get directly into the fire.”

Sergei Karaganov, an influential former adviser and hardliner, has repeatedly warned of the erosion of deterrence. In 2023–2025 interventions, he argued the West “forgot the horrors of war and even stopped fearing nuclear weapons,” necessitating threshold reduction: “The enemy crosses one red line after another… Mirror responses are a purely defensive tactic.” By late 2024, he urged “steps up the ladder of nuclear escalation… Until finally the Europeans run away,” advocating strikes on active NATO participants (“We should also start striking targets in the countries that are most actively participating in NATO’s aggression”) and labeling the alliance a “cancer.”

Dmitry Trenin echoed the call for action over rhetoric: “It’s Time for Russia to Give the West a Nuclear Reminder.” He and his allies contend that a traditional defensive posture fails against a perceived proxy war, demanding “nuclear signaling in action.” Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, has nuanced the debate. While cautioning in 2023 that Russia “won’t be able to ‘sober up the West’ with a nuclear bomb,” by April 2026, he acknowledged U.S. actions elsewhere “exacerbated” hardliner currents: diplomacy stands discredited, and “nuclear arms, the red button… might be the only guarantee against such an aggressive policy.” Putin himself has iteratively redefined thresholds, from NATO expansion to long-range strikes or “massed aerospace attacks”, while state media portrays each Western increment (Oreshnik tests notwithstanding) as proof that blurred lines invite further probing.

This narrative sustains unity: external incrementalism justifies internal sacrifices, yet fuels hardliner momentum when incidents such as drone strikes at the presidential site or refinery strikes expose vulnerabilities.

Three Scenarios: Persistent Poking and the Angry Bear’s Response

Continued Western “poking”, deeper strikes, NATO infrastructure aid, or Tomahawk-like systems, risk distinct trajectories, as Russian commentators map them.

Positive Scenario: The Deterrent Awakening (Bear Forces Retreat)
Hardliners envision escalation as restorative. Karaganov posits limited nuclear signaling or conventional strikes on European enablers (Poland, UK, Germany first) could “sober up” the West, compelling withdrawal: “We will have to make nuclear deterrence a convincing argument again by lowering the threshold… The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a preemptive strike.” Ultranationalists like Malofeev-Dugin project maximalist gains: territorial consolidation, the EU's collapse, and a Russian-led security architecture by 2036. On this optimistic path, blurred red lines finally provoke a decisive Russian “jumping from the boiler,” restoring fear without a full thermonuclear exchange.

Neutral Scenario: The Prolonged Attrition (Enduring Slow Boil)
Pragmatists and moderates anticipate stalemate: economic strain mounts (brain drain, sanctions bite), but repression and resource mobilization sustain the front. Timofeev’s caution, “after jumping out… you can get directly into the fire”, prevails, with incremental Western aid met by asymmetric hybrid responses (sabotage, energy leverage) rather than nuclear leaps. Putin arbitrates, balancing demands with technocratic warnings of collapse. Public fatigue grows (polls already favor talks), yet “rally” effects and territorial gains prevent collapse. As Lukyanov observed on related crises, “each next attempt… will bring us to the same agenda, but in the worst situation for Ukraine.” The boil persists: costly for all, but no rupture, Russia endures as a sanctioned but intact power, waiting for Western cohesion to fray.

Negative Scenario: The Catastrophic Escalation (Spiral into Fire)
Pessimists warn of miscalculation: perceived existential threats (massed strikes, NATO “hubs,” or sovereignty erosion) trigger doctrine-mandated response. Karaganov’s ladder, preemptive limited strikes escalating to waves, could ignite if “the Europeans run away” fails. Trenin’s “nuclear reminder” becomes reality amid elite panic or hardliner dominance. Lukyanov’s “very disturbing scenarios” materialize: unimaginable years ago, now plausible. Economic desperation (2026 exhaustion forecasts) or battlefield reversal accelerates the leap. Worst outcome, with Russia’s survival uncertain amid the risk of mutual destruction.

Russian experts caution that underestimating a cornered nuclear power courts catastrophe. Persistent poking risks transforming the slow boil into explosive rupture, underscoring the imperative for realistic off-ramps before the frog, or the bear, forces a reckoning no one can control.

Grok assisted, all prompting and editing by Willem Middelkoop